[OPSEC] blockchain for IP addresses draft update

[Jordi Paillissé Vilanova]

(apologies for cross-posting)

Dear all,

We have submitted a new version of the draft addressing comments
received both on the mailing list and IETF meetings.

Thanks to all of you for taking the time to read the draft :)

Regards,

Jordi

-------- Missatge reenviat --------
Assumpte: New Version Notification for
draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain-02.txt
Data: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 08:38:07 -0700
De: internet-***@ietf.org
A: Alberto Rodriguez-Natal <***@cisco.com>, Vina Ermagan
<***@cisco.com>, Leo Vegoda <***@vegoda.org>, Albert Cabellos
<***@ac.upc.edu>, Albert Cabellos-Aparicio <***@ac.upc.edu>,
Jordi Paillisse <***@ac.upc.edu>, Fabio Maino <***@cisco.com>



A new version of I-D, draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Jordi Paillisse and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name: draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain
Revision: 02
Title: An analysis of the applicability of blockchain to secure IP addresses allocation, delegation and bindings.
Document date: 2018-06-28
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 30
URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain-02.txt
Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain/
Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain-02
Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain
Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-paillisse-sidrops-blockchain-02

Abstract:
This document analyzes how blockchain technology can be used to
secure the allocation, delegation and binding to topological
information of the IP address space. The main outcomes of the
analysis are that blockchain is suitable in environments with
multiple distrusting parties and that Proof of Stake is a potential
candidate for a consensus algorithm.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

[David Mazieres]

Post by Jordi Paillissé Vilanova
(apologies for cross-posting)
Dear all,
We have submitted a new version of the draft addressing comments
received both on the mailing list and IETF meetings.
Thanks to all of you for taking the time to read the draft :)
Regards,
Jordi

Very interesting draft. One high-level comment, I would avoid terms
like "tamper-proof" or really anything-"proof" except possibly in the
context of information-theoretic security, in favor of tamper-resistant.
This is particularly important in the context of blockchains that have
experienced a number of forks in practice and where it would likely take
only a few tens of millions of dollars a day to tamper with history.

I think the draft would benefit from a much finer-grained consideration
of several different forms of proof-of-stake, because there are a number
of assertions that do not hold for all forms of proof of stake. E.g.,
will there be delegation like peercoin, randomization like algorand,
penalties like Casper, sleepy nodes like snowwhite?

And while of course I'm biased on this issue, I think that a
Byzantine-agreement-based approach like SCP
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mazieres-dinrg-scp/) would work
better than PoS. SCP is well matched to the Internet peering model,
which we already know is a workable decentralized governance model. You
may not agree, but it would at least be nice for the document to explain
why you reject this approach.

David

[Jordi Paillissé Vilanova]

Hi David,

Indeed, we did not delve deeper into the PoS algorithm. This depends on
the specific implementation, our opinion is that an Algroand-like would
be a good option, and if it can tolerate a large portion of offline
participants even better. In addition, we think that punishing or
deposit mechanisms are not desirable because they don't fit the
characteristics of the scenario. Overall the incentive is "a more secure
Internet", we believe that this is well-aligned with the economical
interests of the participants.

Regarding SCP, the fact that you only need to trust your neighbours may
prove very convenient in this scenario. As you said, it reflects current
Internet trust schemes, this basically means that BGP Peering = Trust =
Stellar quorum slices. We'll look into this for the next iteration of
the draft.

Thanks

Jordi

Post by David Mazieres

Post by Jordi Paillissé Vilanova
(apologies for cross-posting)
Dear all,
We have submitted a new version of the draft addressing comments
received both on the mailing list and IETF meetings.
Thanks to all of you for taking the time to read the draft :)
Regards,
Jordi

Very interesting draft. One high-level comment, I would avoid terms
like "tamper-proof" or really anything-"proof" except possibly in the
context of information-theoretic security, in favor of tamper-resistant.
This is particularly important in the context of blockchains that have
experienced a number of forks in practice and where it would likely take
only a few tens of millions of dollars a day to tamper with history.
I think the draft would benefit from a much finer-grained consideration
of several different forms of proof-of-stake, because there are a number
of assertions that do not hold for all forms of proof of stake. E.g.,
will there be delegation like peercoin, randomization like algorand,
penalties like Casper, sleepy nodes like snowwhite?
And while of course I'm biased on this issue, I think that a
Byzantine-agreement-based approach like SCP
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mazieres-dinrg-scp/) would work
better than PoS. SCP is well matched to the Internet peering model,
which we already know is a workable decentralized governance model. You
may not agree, but it would at least be nice for the document to explain
why you reject this approach.
David

[Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)]

Hi Jordi,

Very good document.

I hate to ask things without providing code but I believe it would be great if you add a section regarding the “relying party”, how would the validation algorithm would look like and what is the bootstrap process. I can see that some public key info would need to be known by the RP.

Regards,
Roque


From: OPSEC <opsec-***@ietf.org> on behalf of Jordi Paillissé Vilanova <***@ac.upc.edu>
Date: Wednesday 4 July 2018 at 13:28
To: David Mazieres expires 2018-09-30 PDT <mazieres-***@temporary-address.scs.stanford.edu>, "***@ietf.org" <***@ietf.org>, "***@irtf.org" <***@irtf.org>, Stephane Bortzmeyer <***@nic.fr>, "***@tislabs.com" <***@tislabs.com>, Greg Skinner <***@icloud.com>, "***@vegoda.org" <***@vegoda.org>, "Alberto Rodriguez Natal (natal)" <***@cisco.com>, "Vina Ermagan (vermagan)" <***@cisco.com>, "Fabio Maino (fmaino)" <***@cisco.com>, Albert Cabellos <***@ac.upc.edu>, "***@ietf.org" <***@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OPSEC] [Din] blockchain for IP addresses draft update


Hi David,

Indeed, we did not delve deeper into the PoS algorithm. This depends on the specific implementation, our opinion is that an Algroand-like would be a good option, and if it can tolerate a large portion of offline participants even better. In addition, we think that punishing or deposit mechanisms are not desirable because they don't fit the characteristics of the scenario. Overall the incentive is "a more secure Internet", we believe that this is well-aligned with the economical interests of the participants.

Regarding SCP, the fact that you only need to trust your neighbours may prove very convenient in this scenario. As you said, it reflects current Internet trust schemes, this basically means that BGP Peering = Trust = Stellar quorum slices. We'll look into this for the next iteration of the draft.

Thanks

Jordi

El 02/07/18 a les 17:59, David Mazieres ha escrit:

Jordi Paillissé Vilanova <***@ac.upc.edu><mailto:***@ac.upc.edu> writes:



(apologies for cross-posting)



Dear all,



We have submitted a new version of the draft addressing comments

received both on the mailing list and IETF meetings.



Thanks to all of you for taking the time to read the draft :)



Regards,



Jordi

Very interesting draft. One high-level comment, I would avoid terms

like "tamper-proof" or really anything-"proof" except possibly in the

context of information-theoretic security, in favor of tamper-resistant.

This is particularly important in the context of blockchains that have

experienced a number of forks in practice and where it would likely take

only a few tens of millions of dollars a day to tamper with history.



I think the draft would benefit from a much finer-grained consideration

of several different forms of proof-of-stake, because there are a number

of assertions that do not hold for all forms of proof of stake. E.g.,

will there be delegation like peercoin, randomization like algorand,

penalties like Casper, sleepy nodes like snowwhite?



And while of course I'm biased on this issue, I think that a

Byzantine-agreement-based approach like SCP

(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mazieres-dinrg-scp/) would work

better than PoS. SCP is well matched to the Internet peering model,

which we already know is a workable decentralized governance model. You

may not agree, but it would at least be nice for the document to explain

why you reject this approach.



David

[Jordi Paillissé Vilanova]

Hi Roque,

We have built an open-source prototype [1], and it works like you
mentioned: the genesis block includes the public keys that the RP has to
trust. It is a one-time action in which you trust the source code and
the keys contained in it.

Thanks for your comments, we'll include them in the next version.

Regards,

Jordi

[1] https://github.com/OpenOverlayRouter/blockchain-mapping-system

Post by Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)
Hi Jordi,
Very good document.
I hate to ask things without providing code but I believe it would be
great if you add a section regarding the “relying party”, how would
the validation algorithm would look like and what is the bootstrap
process. I can see that some public key info would need to be known by
the RP.
Regards,
Roque
*Date: *Wednesday 4 July 2018 at 13:28
*To: *David Mazieres expires 2018-09-30 PDT
*Subject: *Re: [OPSEC] [Din] blockchain for IP addresses draft update
Hi David,
Indeed, we did not delve deeper into the PoS algorithm. This depends
on the specific implementation, our opinion is that an Algroand-like
would be a good option, and if it can tolerate a large portion of
offline participants even better. In addition, we think that punishing
or deposit mechanisms are not desirable because they don't fit the
characteristics of the scenario. Overall the incentive is "a more
secure Internet", we believe that this is well-aligned with the
economical interests of the participants.
Regarding SCP, the fact that you only need to trust your neighbours
may prove very convenient in this scenario. As you said, it reflects
current Internet trust schemes, this basically means that BGP Peering
= Trust = Stellar quorum slices. We'll look into this for the next
iteration of the draft.
Thanks
Jordi
(apologies for cross-posting)
Dear all,
We have submitted a new version of the draft addressing comments
received both on the mailing list and IETF meetings.
Thanks to all of you for taking the time to read the draft :)
Regards,
Jordi
Very interesting draft.  One high-level comment, I would avoid terms
like "tamper-proof" or really anything-"proof" except possibly in the
context of information-theoretic security, in favor of tamper-resistant.
This is particularly important in the context of blockchains that have
experienced a number of forks in practice and where it would likely take
only a few tens of millions of dollars a day to tamper with history.
I think the draft would benefit from a much finer-grained consideration
of several different forms of proof-of-stake, because there are a number
of assertions that do not hold for all forms of proof of stake.  E.g.,
will there be delegation like peercoin, randomization like algorand,
penalties like Casper, sleepy nodes like snowwhite?
And while of course I'm biased on this issue, I think that a
Byzantine-agreement-based approach like SCP
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mazieres-dinrg-scp/) would work
better than PoS.  SCP is well matched to the Internet peering model,
which we already know is a workable decentralized governance model.  You
may not agree, but it would at least be nice for the document to explain
why you reject this approach.
David